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Germany’s German Constitution 
RUSSELL A. MILLER* 
Comparative lawyers, working with blunt taxonomies such as “legal families,” have 
been satisfied with characterizing Germany as representative or a member of the 
“Germanic-Roman” law tradition. The life of the Federal Republic’s post-war legal 
culture, however, reveals a richly more complicated story. The civil law tradition, with its 
emphasis on abstract conceptualism and codification, remains dominant. But it has had 
to accommodate a new, vigorous constitutionalism that bears many of the traits of the 
common law tradition, including judicial supremacy and a form of case law. This is the 
encounter of discrete legal traditions within a particular legal system that H. Patrick 
Glenn imagined. The dialogue between the civil law and common law traditions in the 
German legal system has produced symbiotic effects. In this article, I suggest a number of 
ways in which Germany’s prevailing civil law culture uniquely shapes and marks its 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Not long ago I visited the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) with a group of my American law students. When 
our tour of the Court reached the luminous, wood-and-glass hearing 
chamber, our guide triumphantly declared: “Welcome to the only common 
law court in Germany!” 
It would have pleased the legendary comparative law scholar H. 
Patrick Glenn to hear it.1 In his seminal work, Legal Traditions of the World, 
he argues that legal systems such as Germany’s cannot be categorically 
classified as emblematic of a single legal tradition.2 Glenn contends that 
state legal systems are the sites of encounters between the world’s 
complex, commensurable, and interdependent legal traditions.3 He uses 
																																																						
1. Sadly, McGill University Law Professor H. Patrick Glenn passed away in 2014. A memorial 
essay in the American Journal of Comparative Law, a publication produced by the American Society of 
Comparative Law (over which he presided as President at the time of his death), described him as 
“one of the most respected comparatists of our time.” David J. Gerber, In Memoriam, H. Patrick Glenn 
(1940 –2014), 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (2015); see also Daniel Jutras, Saying Goodbye to Professor H. Patrick 
Glenn (1940–2014), MCGILL U. FAC. L. NEWS (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.mcgill.ca/law/channels/ 
news/saying-goodbye-professor-h-patrick-glenn-1940-2014-239330.  
2. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 368 (5th ed. 2014) (“All 
categories are vague . . . all efforts at separation are arbitrary and artificial.”).  
3. Id. at 43; see also H. Patrick Glenn, Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
133 (2001). 
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words such as “bridging,” “dialogue,” and “interchange” to describe this 
unavoidable dynamic, which he imagined to be something similar to 
Russian nesting dolls, with lateral traditions and subtraditions supporting 
and complementing a system’s leading or primary tradition.4 The tour 
guide at the Constitutional Court seemed to have all of this in mind, 
implying that German constitutional law (embodied by the Constitutional 
Court) represents the subaltern common law tradition asserting itself in the 
German legal culture, which is predominantly shaped by the continental or 
civil law tradition. 
This is not a novel characterization of Germany’s post-war legal 
culture. Others have remarked on the tension that resulted from the 
encounter between the new constitutional law and the old civilian legal 
order.5 In fact, the story is usually cast in less reconciliatory terms than 
Glenn would have preferred. Germany’s ordinary courts, our tour guide 
was suggesting, are the carriers of the German legal culture’s predominant 
civil law gene.6 But the Constitutional Court represents a recessive — 
albeit thriving — common law genetic adaptation that has gradually 
conquered and colonized Germany’s civilian legal culture.7 According to 
this account of developments in post-war German law, while facing 
resistance from the ordinary courts and the German legal culture’s 
entrenched civil law orientation, the Federal Constitutional Court 
heroically overcame the system’s formalism and positivism in its common-
law-like pursuit of constitutional justice. In fact, few courts have shaken 
off the continent’s old civilian shackles and taken up the common law 
judicial role with as much gusto as the German Constitutional Court.8 The 
																																																						
4. GLENN, supra note 2, at 366–67, 373–74.  
5. See Thomas Dietrich, Bedeutung der Grundrechte im Zivilrecht, in 60 JAHRE GRUNDGESETZ–
VORTRAGSREIHE 97 (Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht der Universität Kassel ed., 2010). Dietrich refers 
to a “krachende Konfrontation der Grundrechte mit dem geltende Zivilrecht . . . .” (“crashing 
confrontation between constitutional rights and private law . . . .”). Id. at 101 (Miller trans.). 
6. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 58–60, 
63–72 (3d ed. 1985); MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 76 (2014); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & 
ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 31 (3d ed. 2007); John Henry Merryman, 
How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1871 (1988) (“The ‘old’ 
individual rights . . . have largely been achieved and solidified in the work of ordinary courts quietly 
applying the traditional sources (principally the civil codes) and methods of private law.”). 
7. See Merryman, supra note 6 (“The rise of constitutionalism is thus an additional form of 
decodification: the civil codes no longer serve the constitutional function, which has moved from the 
most private of private law sources-the civil code-to the most public of public law sources-the 
constitution.”); see also A. Pearce Higgins, The Making of the German Civil Code, 6 J. SOC’Y COMP. 
LEGIS. 95, 96 (1905) (“[F]or the first time in the history of Germany, there came into being a 
veritable common law, which, sweeping away all anomalies and local customs, was . . . to regulate the 
relations of all the members of the German Empire in the most important details of private law.”). 
8. Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and 
Policy of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 3 J. COMP. L. 194, 208 (2009) (“The Court’s record . . . 
reveals a self-confident tribunal deeply engaged in Germans’ lives and politics . . . . The number and 
range of cases in which the Federal Constitutional Court has acted to dramatically impact German 
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Herculean role the Court now plays in the German polity might even make 
a native common law jurist blush.9 
This story of dynamic diversity and pluralism within the German legal 
system (what Glenn referred to as “multivalence”) is an important facet of 
Germany’s determined effort to confront and overcome its National 
Socialist past,10 a process the Germans call Vergangenheitsbewältigung.11 In 
this version of the story the civil law tradition helped to shape the 
preexisting legal culture, and it functions as the negative frame against 
which Germany’s post-war constitutionalism serves as a rebuke.12 As a 
matter of substantive law, the fronts in this Kulturkampf especially involved 
family law and gender equality, but noteworthy skirmishes have also taken 
place in contract law, tort law, property law, and criminal law. The triumph 
of German constitutional law (and its common law orientation), so the 
myth would have it, required a number of innovative jurisprudential 
devices that are now closely identified with German constitutional law. For 
example, the Constitutional Court pioneered the idea that the 
constitution’s basic rights must be regarded as “objective values” 
applicable across the entire society — and not merely as a set of subjective 
and negative limits on the state’s interactions with its citizens.13 Flowing 
inevitably from this innovation, the Constitutional Court also concluded 
																																																																																																																													
politics are too great to systematically or comprehensively recount in this brief introduction.”); see also 
B. S. Markesinis, Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage: A Common Lawyer Looks at Some Judgments of the 
German Federal Court, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 349, 359 (1986) (“The 1900 Civil Code could not have 
survived without some very daring judicial interventions which, if not allowed by the term judicial 
law-making, come as close as any Common law judge has come into making new law.”). 
9. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239–40 (1986); see also Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 177, 201 (1998) (“In the German case, 
the commitment to Verfassungspatriotismus, or constitutional patriotism, results in the Constitutional 
Court's unusual willingness to decide cases with important foreign policy implications. According to 
Juliane Kokott, this willingness flows from the renewed German commitment to the Rechtstaat in the 
wake of World War II — no questions are above or beyond the law. The Constitutional Court thus 
conceives itself as an equal participant with the political branches of the German government in the 
process of European integration.”).  
10. GLENN, supra note 2, at 368–72. 
11. See PETER REICHEL, VERGANGENHEITSBEWÄLTIGUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND: DIE 
AUSEINANDERSETZUNG MIT DER NS-DIKTATUR IN POLITIK UND JUSTIZ (2001); Thomas 
McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery, 30 POL. THEORY 
623 (2002); see also Word of the Week: Vergangenheitsbewältigung, DEUTSCHE WELLE, http://www.dw.de/ 
vergangenheitsbew%C3%A4ltigung/a-6614103 (last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
12. See Gerhard Casper, Guardians of the Constitution, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 781 (1980) (“It was 
because of those very discontinuities in German constitutional history . . . that the German post-war 
discussion centered on the failure of the German constitutions . . . . Above all, attention was turned 
to the Weimar Constitution, that professionally engineered document, so widely acclaimed in its time, 
such a dismal failure in operation.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
13. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 
BVerfGE 198, 1958 (Ger.) [hereinafter Lüth Case]; see also DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. 
MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 59–
62 (3d ed. 2012); Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 
858–62 (1991). 
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that the Basic Law’s objective values may be applied horizontally — albeit 
indirectly — across all of German law, even in private legal disputes that 
do not involve state action.14 Finally, the Constitutional Court championed 
the use of proportionality in constitutional interpretation, giving itself the 
discretion to weigh constitutional harm and consider constitutional 
priorities on a case-by-case basis.15 Ultimately, this is the myth of the Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz) completing the arch of Germany’s turbulent 
constitutional history by subduing the country’s indigenous civilian 
tendency toward formalism and positivism to truly and at last bind the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary to (constitutional) law and 
justice.16 
The story of constitutional common law’s triumph in Germany 
depends on a number of fundamental premises, which I will survey and 
mostly confirm in Section II. The first premise is that the civil law 
tradition is the primary tradition in the German legal culture. The second 
premise is that constitutional law, as practiced by the Constitutional Court, 
bears many of the hallmarks of the common law tradition. The third 
premise is that there is a tension — perhaps even a hard-fought rivalry — 
between these different jurisprudential orientations in the post-war 
German legal order. The final premise is that the German Constitutional 
Court can claim victory in this struggle because it has succeeded in giving 
the constitution, with its common law orientation, priority (as a legal-
cultural matter and not as a doctrinal matter of constitutional supremacy) 
over the entrenched civil law tradition and especially the revered German 
Civil Code.17 
Yet, although there is considerable evidence of constitutional common 
law’s ascendance in contemporary German legal culture, Glenn 
understood that the encounters between legal traditions within a particular 
system are reciprocal affairs. The post-war constitutional regime 
profoundly introduced elements of the common law tradition into the 
																																																						
14. Lüth Case; see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13; Bernhard Schlink, German 
Constitutional Culture in Transition, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 718 (1993) (“The Court found that 
because fundamental rights had importance not only as subjective rights of citizens against the state, 
but also as society’s most important values, they governed the entire legal order, including civil laws 
that regulated the relationship of citizens to each other.”). 
15. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 13, at 67; see also AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY 
(2012); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002) (Julian Rivers trans.); 
Schlink, supra note 14, at 729 (“While methodologically convincing decisions still occur every now 
and again, there are many others that simply arise from the Court’s feel for what is indicated by social 
and political life-for what is accepted and ‘fits’ into the social and political landscape. Decisions thus 
encompass only the individual cases sub judice, and are expressed and handed down as such.”). 
16. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] arts. 1(3), 20(3), translation at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html. 
17. “The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order . . . .” Id. art. 20(3). (German 
Bundestag trans.). 
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German legal culture.18 But the old, predominant civilian legal tradition in 
Germany has influenced German constitutional law, too. Glenn suggests 
that the interaction of these legal traditions would “blur the distinction 
between the two” and that both traditions would become subject to 
“multivalent, bridging, complexity” involving “rejection, limitation, 
accommodation or even adoption.”19 It is on this unremarked dynamic — 
the civil law tradition’s influence on Germany’s constitutional law — that I 
want to focus in this article. Section III documents the civil law tradition’s 
symbiotic influence on German constitutional law. There is evidence of 
this influence in the character of the constitutional text, in some 
constitutional theory, in the lingering priority given to the legislature (as 
opposed to the judiciary) to develop and refine the constitutional 
framework, in the civilian character of the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction, and in the Constitutional Court’s civilian decisional style. 
My analysis is significant for comparative lawyers’ work because it 
suggests that German constitutional law — if it is to be studied and 
understood at all — must be taken on its own complex, multivalent terms. 
Of course, the common law/civil law interdependence I describe here is 
just one such distinctly contextual facet of German constitutional law. 
There are other influences — ranging from the expansive sweep of 
political history to the contributions made by discrete individuals — that 
make equally important explanatory and determinative contributions to the 
tapestry of contemporary German constitutional law.20 As comparative 
lawyers we ignore this thick web of meaning at the risk of engaging with 
nothing more than a chimera of German constitutional law. The object of 
comparative lawyers’ study cannot be an abstract classification or 
taxonomic archetype of constitutional law, at least not if we want to be 
saying anything about something.21 As this study demonstrates, the Basic 
Law anchors a highly contingent and contextually determined 
constitutional regime that features a unique mix of distinct kinds of 
common law and civil law traditions and much, much more: it is 
Germany’s German constitutional law. 
																																																						
18. Glenn notes the reverse phenomenon in the United States, suggesting that the civil law 
tradition had come to shape American constitutional law. GLENN, supra note 2, at 265. 
19. Id. at 374. 
20. Pierre Legrand calls these elements “traces” and identifies the following as a non-exhaustive 
list of possibilities: “traces of historical configurations enmeshed with traces of political rationalities 
intertwined with traces of social logics interwoven with traces of philosophical postulates plaited with 
traces of linguistic orders darned with traces of economic prescriptions interlaced with traces of 
epistemic assumptions . . . .” Pierre Legrand, Negative Comparative Law, 10 J. COMP. L. 405, 419–20 
(2015). 
21. Contra David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153 (2017). 
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II. HALF THE STORY: GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS THE 
TRIUMPH OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OVER THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 
There is an almost messianic narrative about post-war German law 
that suggests that the Basic Law has vanquished the formalistic and 
positivistic impulses in the German legal culture that are the residue of the 
civil law tradition’s historical predominance in Germany. This myth 
depends on four premises. The first is that German legal culture is steeped 
in the civil law tradition’s statutory formalism and positivism. The second 
is that constitutional law, with its focus on judicial interpretation and case-
by-case decision-making, resembles the common law. The third is that the 
German Constitutional Court, as the guardian of the constitution (and, 
thereby, the prophet of the common law tradition in Germany’s civilian 
desert), has had to struggle against the enduring dominance of the civil law 
in post-war Germany.22 The fourth is that the German Constitutional 
Court has triumphed in this struggle, ushering in an era of previously 
unattainable constitutional law and justice — of Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Each of 
these premises has a basis in truth, which will be explored in this section. 
Before turning to that endeavor, I will first offer brief definitions of 
the “civil law” and “common law” traditions, which are two concepts that 
are fundamental to this study. 
A. The Civil Law and Common Law Traditions Defined  
Throughout this article I refer to the “civil law” and “common law” to 
represent two distinct legal traditions from among the many that find 
expression in the world. These are old labels with considerable explanatory 
force.23 They are also quite dangerous. In the worst cases they are asserted 
as taxa — static and exclusive categories — into which many of the 
world’s legal systems can be dumped in our mania to classify or map global 
legal phenomena.24 Drawing almost satirically from the natural sciences, 
comparative lawyers have sometimes called these categories “legal 
families,”25 as if they represent empirically discoverable biological species.26 
																																																						
22. Kommers, supra note 13 (providing details about the Constitutional Court’s background, 
including antecedent tribunals as well as the intentions and ambitions of the drafters of the Basic 
Law, in which the Court is specifically identified). 
23. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6; see also Jorge L. Esquirol, René David: At the Head of the 
Legal Family, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 212 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001). 
24. See SIEMS, supra note 6, at 41–43. 
25. See Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043 (2012); 
H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 421 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); 
Jaakko Husa, Legal Families, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 382 (Jan M. Smits 
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Elsewhere I argue that this kind of taxonomic thinking in comparative law 
is perilous because it is superficial and allows us to ignore the dynamic and 
discursive character of sociological phenomena such as the law.27 These 
legal families (and other encompassing archetypes) seem to tell us so much 
about a legal system only because they tell us nothing at all. 
I do not use legal traditions as a taxonomic device. I am not interested 
in trying to definitively classify Germany (or any other legal system) as 
belonging to an exclusive legal family. First, I embrace Glenn’s definition of 
“legal traditions,” which represent identifiable epistemic constellations of 
normative information about ways of doing (and not doing) the law.28 
Glenn explains: “[T]radition emerges as a loose conglomeration of data, 
organized around a basic theme or themes . . . .”29 That information, he 
argues, counts as tradition because it is carried forward from the past to 
the present. I find that Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo have helpfully 
clarified Glenn’s concept of “legal traditions,” concluding that they are 
 [a] set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about 
the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the 
polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal 
system, and about the way the law is or should be made, applied, 
studied, perfected, and taught.30 
Second, I share Glenn’s conviction that many different legal traditions 
can exist as part of a dynamic discourse within a single legal system. For 
example, Glenn tells of the churning mix of Hindu legal tradition, Islamic 
legal tradition, and British common law tradition in India.31 Hindu digests 
“continued to be written through the arrival of the British,” Glenn 
explains. But the “arrival of the British was to supplant both Hindu and 
Islamic law as territorial law,” leaving these traditions with a “special 
status, as personal laws of Hindu or Islamic people.”32 This colonial 
“reception” of western law, perhaps better understood as the violent 
imposition of the colonizer’s legal traditions,33 was repeated along the 
knife-edge of western expansion in the world.34 Still, Glenn could 
																																																																																																																													
ed., 2006); Jaako Husa, Classification of Legal Families Today. Is it Time for a Memorial Hymn?, 56 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 11 (2004). 
26. Pargendler, supra note 25, at 1050. 
27. See generally Russell A. Miller, Comparative Law’s Taxonomy Problem (Apr. 15, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
28. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 12–14. 
29. Id. at 16. 
30. MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 2. 
31. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 312. 
32. Id. at 310–11. 
33. See Upendra Baxi, The Colonialist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS 
AND TRANSITIONS 46 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). 
34. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 345. 
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conclude that “[t]he effect of English law on Hindu law [in India] was . . . 
not immediate or abrupt, nor did it prejudice the legitimacy and availability 
of classic Hindu sources. The change was more subtle . . . . ”35 Used in this 
way, legal traditions merely provide a means for talking about the 
multivalent legal attitudes that are in conversation within any legal system, 
such as the interchange between the civil law tradition and the common 
law tradition in Germany. 
As a way of thinking about what the law is or should be, the civil law 
tradition is commonly understood to be the heir to the Roman ius civile.36 
This ancient provenance — and the civil law’s far-reaching reception 
around the world — led David and Brierley to refer to it as the “first 
family of laws.”37 Legal scholars play a prominent role in developing and 
extending the tradition,38 even if the ideal source of law within the civil law 
tradition is now a highly systematic and comprehensive code.39 It is the 
legislator’s and professor’s law, not the judge’s. Judges are thought to play 
an almost bureaucratic function in the formalistic, positivistic, and 
deductive application of the code’s settled concepts to the facts of any 
given case.40 The spirit of the civil law tradition, it is argued, has always 
been its moral recognition of the individual.41 It is necessary to point out, 
however, that this rough sketch of the civil law tradition glosses over what 
many see as discursive diversity within the so-called civil law family. It is 
often subdivided between French and German siblings.42 David and 
Brierley felt obliged to call it the “Romano-Germanic family.”43 A 
fundamental difference between these siblings is thought to be the high 
degree of systematization found in the German codifications that is lacking 
																																																						
35. Id. at 311. 
36. See MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 6. 
37. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 33; see also MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra 
note 6, at 3 (“The civil law tradition is older, more widely distributed, and more influential than the 
common law tradition . . . . It should be added that many people believe the civil law to be culturally 
superior to the common law, which seems to them to be relatively crude and unorganized.”). 
38. See MERRYMAN & PÉRERZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 56. 
39. See id. at 27. 
40. See id. at 36 (“The picture of the judicial process that emerges is one of fairly routine activity; 
the judge becomes a kind of expert clerk . . . the judge’s function is merely to find the right legislative 
provision, couple it with the fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less automatically 
produced from the union.”). 
41. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 147–51. 
42. “The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) appeared at the end, and the French Civil 
Code at the beginning, of the turbulent century of the Industrial Revolution. The German Code 
emerged from an intellectual and political background that differed in many ways from the 
Enlightenment and revolutionary thought that informed the Code Civil. It is thus not surprising that 
Germany and France have inspired somewhat different sub-traditions in the civil law world.” MARY 
ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN 
A NUTSHELL 38 (3d ed. 2008).  
43. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 33. 
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in the French Civil Code.44 This is one of the civilian features of German 
constitutional law that I will illuminate in this article. For that reason, I 
have to concede that I am really only talking about the reverse influence of 
German civil law on German constitutional law, while at the same time 
accepting that all of these labels represent dynamic and evolving 
conditions depending on what kind of normative information is being 
carried forward from the past into the contemporary life of the law in 
Germany. 
The civil law’s foil is imagined to be the common law tradition.45 The 
common law does not share the civil law’s Roman roots (or at least not to 
the same degree).46 It is the product of the Norman conquerors’ efforts to 
govern occupied — and often hostile — England.47 This led to some of 
the common law tradition’s most distinctive characteristics, including an 
empowered judiciary working on a case-by-case basis with local norms and 
in cooperation with local populations to settle on the most acceptable (or 
least offensive) substantive rules to resolve disputes as they arose.48 The 
galvanizing focus of the tradition was on the process leading to the court’s 
jurisdiction over the case, and not the substantive resolution of the case 
once the courthouse doors had been pried open.49 The accretion of these 
judicial decisions is the case law that has priority in the common law 
tradition.50 The common law is altogether less conceptual and less 
systematic. It is inductively focused on facts, which we are told “are the 
life of the law.”51 But here, too, I cannot neglect the practice of 
recognizing distinct Anglo and American currents within the so-called 
common law family.52 A key difference between the two, according to 
David and Brierley, is the Americans’ unique and less rigorous application 
of the rule of precedent or stare decisis.53 David and Brierley conclude: 
Really, all that can be said with certainty about the American rule 
of stare decisis is that, as compared to the corresponding rule in 
England, it has an important limitation: the United States Supreme 
Court and the supreme courts of the different states are not bound 
																																																						
44. See id. at 71. 
45. See id. at 334 (“English legal structure is not the same as that of French law and it poses the 
greatest difficulty for a continental jurist since it is, in fact, totally different to anything with which he 
is familiar.”); MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 6, at 1–5; SIEMS, supra note 6, at 43–64. 
46. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 309–11. 
47. See id. at 311–18; GLENN, supra note 2, at 237–41. 
48. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 237–41. 
49. See id. at 254–55. 
50. See id. at 243; DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 366–67, 376–78. 
51. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
52. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 397, 407. 
53. See id. at 434–35. 
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to observe their own decisions and may, therefore, operate a 
reversal of previously established judicial practice.54 
It is this kind of unbounded judicial authority, among other factors, 
that convinces me of the temperamental link between the common law 
tradition and constitutionalism. And so I have to concede that I may only 
be talking about an American style of common law constitutionalism. 
Glenn knew that the traditions that interested him were complex, 
evolving, and contingent in confounding ways, and that they could only do 
limited service as fixed concepts.55 Still, he believed that they maintained 
“some form of external coherence.”56 It is in this spirit that I rely on such 
traditions here, where they do just enough to allow us to look for the 
surprising interplay of diverse approaches to the law in the context of the 
German legal system. 
B. The Predominance of the Civil Law Tradition in Germany 
In any myth worthy of the name, a hero must achieve his 
enlightenment by passing a test.57 In fact, the odds were long that the 
common law tradition — with the priority and privilege it extends to 
judges at the expense of the legislature — would gain a prominent 
foothold in Germany. The German legal culture, after all, is definitively 
civilian.58 The German Federal Justice Minister once insisted that 
“German law is steeped in the tradition of the system of codified law that 
has evolved throughout continental Europe and that has proven its worth 
																																																						
54. Id. 
55. See GLENN, supra note 2, at 366–76. 
56. Id. at 374; see also James R. Fox, Common Law, in DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 62 (3d ed. 2003); James R. Fox, Civil Law, in DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 55 (3d ed. 2003); HOLMES, supra note 51; MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-
PERDOMO, supra note 6; GLENN, supra note 2, at 133, 237; Caslav Pejovic, Civil Law and Common Law: 
Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 817, 819 (2001) 
(“One of the basic characteristics of the civil law is that the courts main task is to apply and interpret 
the law contained in a code, or a statute to case facts. The assumption is that the code regulates all 
cases that could occur in practice, and when certain cases are not regulated by the code, the courts 
should apply some of the general principles used to fill the gaps . . . . The most obvious distinction 
between civil law and common law systems is a that civil law system is a codified system, whereas the 
common law is not created by means of legislation but is based mainly on case law. The principle is 
that earlier judicial decisions, usually of the higher courts, made in a similar case, should be followed 
in the subsequent cases, i.e. that precedents should be respected.”). 
57. “Our hero, then, has to qualify for the throne in two ways: he must pass a test in some such 
subject as rain-making or riddle-guessing, and he must win a victory over the reigning king.” LORD 
FITZROY RAGLAN, THE HERO: A STUDY IN TRADITION, MYTH, AND DRAMA 190–91 (1956); see 
also JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES (3d ed. 2008). 
58. See LAW — MADE IN GERMANY 7 (2d ed. 2012), http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/Law-
Made_in_Germany.pdf (“German law belongs to the long-standing family of continental European 
legal systems in the tradition of Roman law . . . . This legal family is characterised by its codified 
system of legal provisions, e.g. in the form of statutes.”). 
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even in difficult times.”59 German law is presented as an example of the 
continental civil, or codified, legal tradition in most comparative law 
projects,60 including the best-known English-language introductions to the 
German legal system.61 
The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch or “BGB”), and the 
prominence it enjoys in Germany, is the clearest indication of the far-
reaching influence the civil law tradition has had over German legal 
culture.62 The Civil Code has been an intense point of pride for Germans 
and is a leading export of one of the world’s leading exporters.63 The Civil 
Code, after all, was a source of political and cultural unity for a long-
fragmented people.64 For more than a century the Civil Code has been 
law’s foundation in German society. In one English-language introduction 
to the German legal system the point is made this way: “In Germany, all 
important legal issues and matters are governed by comprehensive 
																																																						
59. Id. at 3. 
60. See, e.g., GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 63; DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 49–75; 
GLENN, supra note 2, at 133–80.  
61. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in INTRODUCTION 
TO GERMAN LAW 7, 9 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2005) (“[T]he civilian tradition . . . 
still provides a fair idea of what may be dubbed German legal culture.”); NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH 
SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 3 (3d ed. 2002) (“The German legal system belongs to 
the central European family of legal systems, broadly classified as civil law countries.”); HOWARD D. 
FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE XXVII (4th ed. 2009) (“The 
German legal system remains, generally speaking, a system of (positive) norms i.e. traditional German 
legal thinking revolves, in the vast majority of cases, around the twin immutable ‘pillars’ of an 
established system and norms regarded as authoritative.”); E.J. COHN & W. ZDZIEBLO, MANUAL OF 
GERMAN LAW 3 (2d ed. 1968) (“German law is a member of a family of laws, which one might well 
call the European Continental laws . . . . Notwithstanding many and striking differences between the 
branches and members of this family, the basic structure . . . is very similar.”); GERHARD ROBBERS, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 15 (4th ed. 2006) (“German law [has] the characteristics of a 
codified legal system, in other words, one whose rules are laid down in legislation which cover all 
aspects of the law. This characteristic is not the least of the factors which identify Germany law as 
Continental European.”). 
62. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.]; German Civil Code, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/230659/German-Civil-Code (last updated July 20, 
1998) (“The concept of law embodied in the code was the gemeines Recht, the common law based 
on the 6th-century codification of Roman law put in force by the emperor Justinian . . . . Although 
altered to some extent by feudal law, customary law again came under Roman influence in the 15th 
century, when Roman law was received into Germany in an effort to systematize customs and legal 
institutions.”). 
63. The BGB has strongly influenced civil law codifications around the world, including in 
China. Indeed, the first English-language translation of the BGB was prepared by the Chinese scholar 
Chung Hui Wang. See CHUNG HUI WANG, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE — TRANSLATED AND 
ANNOTATED WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND APPENDICES (1907); see also Russell A. 
Miller, Law Land: Germany as a Legal Super Power, in AM. INST. FOR CONTEMP. GERMAN STUD. POL’Y 
REP. (2015), http://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/GAI-17-Germany-Law-
Land.pdf; Ernest J. Schuster, A Chinese Commentary on the German Civil Code, 8 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 
247 (1907).  
64. See NEIL MACGREGOR, GERMANY: MEMORIES OF A NATION (2014); see also Higgins, supra 
note 7, at 96. 
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legislation in the form of statutes, codes and regulations. The most 
important legislation in the area of business law includes . . . the Civil 
Code.”65 At the time of its enactment and entry into force, the Civil Code 
was described in nearly breathless terms: 
• “The greatest among [Germany’s] exploits is a Civil Code;”66 
• “[The Civil Code is] a monument of legal learning and . . . one 
of the ripest expressions of the aims and methods of modern 
civil jurisprudence;”67 
• “[The Civil Code] works an almost unprecedented revolution 
in the jural life of the German Empire. It may well be 
questioned whether an upheaval of like extent has ever taken 
place anywhere;”68 
• “[The Civil Code] is the most carefully considered statement 
of a nation’s laws that the world has ever seen.”69 
More than a century after its promulgation, the Civil Code is in force 
almost exactly in its original form. One commentary sums up the wonder 
of the Civil Code’s endurance in these terms: “The fact that the BGB has 
lasted so long, providing legal solutions to a variety of social and economic 
problems arising under imperial, social democratic, totalitarian and liberal 
social state political regimes, provides a lasting tribute to the wisdom and 
foresight of its drafters. The BGB has served Germany well.”70 Another 
contemporary scholar simply called the Civil Code “one of the 
masterpieces of European legal culture.”71 
What makes the Civil Code — and the German legal culture it both 
embodies and enraptures — so paradigmatically civilian? First, although it 
is circular to say it, the Civil Code itself is profound evidence of the civil 
law tradition’s grip on the German legal culture. After all, codification is a 
central feature of the civil law tradition.72  
																																																						
65. LAW — MADE IN GERMANY, supra note 58, at 7. 
66. Frederic William Maitland, The Making of the German Civil Code, in 3 THE COLLECTED 
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 474, 476 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911). 
67. Ernst Freund, The Proposed German Civil Code, 24 AM. L. REV. 237, 254 (1890). 
68. Arthur Ameisen, Some Features of the New Civil Code of the German Empire, 33 AM. L. REV. 396, 
407 (1899). 
69. Higgins, supra note 7, at 105 (quoting OTTO FRIEDRICH VON GIERKE, POLITICAL 
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE xvii (Frederick William Maitland trans., 1900)). 
70. Joseph J. Darby, The Influence of the German Civil Code on Law in the United States, 1999 J. S. 
AFR. L. 84, 84 (1999). 
71. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The German Proposal of an “Anti-Discrimination”-Law: Anticonstitutional 
and Anti-Common Sense: A Response to Nicola Vennemann, 3 GER. L.J., no. 4, 2002, at para. 1, 
https://www.germanlawjournal.com/volume-03-no-05. 
72. See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 61, at 3 (“One of its basic features is that a country which 
has adopted the civil law tradition would usually have as the core of its legal system five codes, 
normally including civil law in the Roman law definition, criminal law, civil procedural law, criminal 
procedural law, and commercial law.”). 
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Second, as with the other achievements of the civil law tradition, the 
Civil Code traces its roots to Roman law.73 Yet the German process of 
codification did not involve a direct adoption of the Justinian legacy. 
Under the influence of von Savigny, the Civil Code instead sought to 
Germanize the Roman heritage so that it would reflect the spirit of the 
German people, a concept von Savigny called the Volksgeist.74 According 
to Catherine Valcke, the French civilian orientation (surely the world’s 
“other” great codification) is characterized by a single conceptual 
framework, namely the revolutionary force of rationality. Only rationality 
could explain the violent rupture with the historical inertia of tradition and 
caste that ordered French society prior to the Revolution.75 “Centuries of 
history were to be erased,” Valcke explains, “and a whole new nation 
rebuilt out of ideas.”76 As its complex, systematic structure demonstrates, 
rationality also has a vital place in the German Civil Code. But Valcke’s 
point is that the BGB accommodated the experiences Germans had made 
with law prior to codification. That von Savigny’s historicism ultimately 
played a fundamental role in the German codification process is evidence 
of the Civil Code’s irrational, culturally contingent possibilities. It might be 
better to understand the Civil Code as a rationalization and codification of 
the historical facts of German law — it was not a clean, rational, and 
revolutionary break with the jurisprudential past. Still, the Roman legacy’s 
rationality and systematics are strongly present in the Civil Code, perhaps 
most obviously in the fact that it is arranged in five parts, or “books,” that 
roughly reflect the Pandects’ division of the Roman law into its relevant 
fields.77 
Third, the Civil Code invariably embodies the jurisprudential features 
that are typically attributed to the civil law tradition. It is an expression of 
the preference for positively enacted legislation, as opposed to judge-made 
law. But the Civil Code is no ordinary statute. It is highly systematic, it has 
comprehensive ambitions, and it aspires to a tightly fitted ordering of life’s 
affairs. The Civil Code superseded all prior-existing law. It is viewed as a 
complete and absolute normative framework. In its completeness, it is 
thought to provide cherished certainty and predictability. Judges are meant 
																																																						
73. See Catherine Valcke, Comparative History and the Internal View of French, German, and English 
Private Law, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 133, 137 (2006) (“It is well-known that German law shares the ius 
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74. Susan Gaylord Gale, A Very German Legal Science: Savigny and the Historical School, 18 STAN. J. 
INT'L L. 123, 131 (1982). 
75. See Valcke, supra note 73, at 139; see also Sarah Maza, Luxury, Morality, and Social Change: Why 
There Was No Middle-Class Consciousness in Prerevolutionary France, 69 J. MOD. HIST. 199 (1997) 
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76. See Valcke, supra note 73, at 139. 
77. See WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO 
MODERN LAW 7, 21 (1938); FOSTER & SULE, supra note 61, at 3. 
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only to apply the Civil Code’s clear and systematic framework. To achieve 
all of this, the Civil Code relies extensively on conceptual logic and 
abstraction in identifying prescribed solutions to human dilemmas. 
The Civil Code is conceptual, rational, scientific, and deductive. This is 
a defensible characterization of Germany’s thoroughly civilian legal 
culture, which Pierre Legrand describes as “the land of Rechtswissenschaft, of 
seemingly relentless legal conceptualism and systematization, or apparently 
incessant categorical thinking, the country where one appreciates being 
told one is a good dogmatician.”78 
C. The Common Law Character of Constitutional Law 
The civil law tradition emphasizes statutory law — for example, taking 
the form of the German Civil Code — and it relies on notions of 
formalism and positivism to greatly limit judicial discretion in the 
interpretation and application of legislation. This is not the way of the 
common law. More than any other legal tradition, the common law has 
been viewed as “the civil law’s other, the difference of its identity.”79 The 
common law’s champions are judges, and its raw materials are the 
particular facts of each case. The common law is inductive, and it is shaped 
by the logic of analogy. 
Especially in the power it bestows on judges at the expense of 
legislation, constitutional law can be seen as possessing many of the 
hallmarks of the common law tradition. Thomas Poole suggests that this 
claim advances the idea that constitutional law is “grounded in 
fundamental common law principles and is structured around the 
institution of the common law court.”80 Two arguments support the claim: 
First, Poole maintains that it is possible to deduce a set of values and 
political commitments that are central to constitutionalism and are 
uniquely expressed by the common law tradition. Second, Poole contends 
that the core features of constitutional law “are most consistently 
recognized and protected by the common law, particularly in the context 
of judicial review.”81 
Walter Murphy argues for the nexus of the common law and 
constitutionalism in his article “Civil Law, Common Law, and 
Constitutional Democracy.”82 “Wondering” about the viability of the new 
constitutions being adopted in Eastern Europe in the 1990s,83 Murphy 
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worried that the new democracies’ civil law orientation might prejudice 
those heady efforts every bit as much as the East-Bloc countries’ post-war 
totalitarian experiences. Had Murphy looked into the roiling constitutional 
futures of Hungary and Poland? On the one hand, he noted that the “most 
successful” constitutional projects were founded in common law legal 
systems. On the other hand, Murphy concludes that civil law legal systems 
produced repeated, dramatic constitutional failures.84 But more than just 
projecting from this rough accounting of constitutional history, Murphy 
advances the fundamental argument that the character of the civil law is at 
odds with constitutionalism and that the character of the common law is 
aligned with constitutionalism. He contrasts “the civil law’s tense 
commitment to order” with the common law’s embrace of chaos.85 The 
civil law, Murphy concludes, “leaves judges no respectable room to 
maneuver,”86 while the common law instructs judges “to walk around 
rather than try to fill in the abyss, to hunker down when the great wind 
blows rather than to attempt to contain it.”87 The common law’s inductive, 
case-by-case approach, Murphy concludes, involves a “supple pragmatism 
over tight logic” that is inherent in the “messiness of constitutional 
politics.”88 
Murphy is not the only scholar to remark on the correlation between 
the common law tradition and constitutionalism. Others note that the 
non-textual balancing tests and constitutional standards that have 
developed in constitutional jurisprudence are more akin to the common 
law than to the practice of any other legal tradition. David Strauss, for 
example, argues that “it is the common law approach . . . that best 
explains, and best justifies, American constitutional law today.”89 Henry 
																																																						
84. Id. at 93. (“The preeminent constitution-making feat was pulled off more than two centuries 
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Monaghan was so persuaded by the linkages that he fashioned a theory of 
the “constitutional common law” that accounts for the law constitutional 
courts develop, either through authoritative constitutional interpretation or 
as a “substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing 
their inspiration and authority from” the constitution.90 It is easy to see 
why this uncontroversial description of the work of constitutional courts 
might be seen as closely allied with the common law tradition. In fact, 
Monaghan’s thesis has gained adherents in the generation since he 
proposed it. More recently, Abigail Moncrieff once again confirmed that 
“the judicial habit of enforcing broad constitutional norms” was precisely 
the “feature of modern constitutionalism that Henry Monaghan famously 
identified [as] ‘the constitutional common law.’”91 Advocates of common 
law constitutionalism have described their approach as the idea “that 
courts do and should develop the meaning of general or ambiguous 
constitutional texts by reference to tradition and precedent, rather than 
original understanding, and the related idea that courts do and should 
proceed in a Burkean, rather than ambitiously rationalist or innovative 
fashion.”92 The Burkean common law tradition — and its near cousin 
constitutionalism — contrast sharply with the civil law tradition. Burke, of 
course, is celebrated for his practical reason, which built its arguments in 
response to specific political circumstances and did not aspire to the 
generality, broad theory, and abstract conceptualism that characterize the 
civil law.93 This very common law understanding of constitutional law 
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69 (1959) (“The essential difference between Burke’s political thought and the type of thinking of 
which he accused his opponents, is that he thought in terms of practical reason, and they, as he saw 
it, did not. That is to say, Burke thought primarily of the end to be achieved and then of the ways of 
attaining it in the given circumstances. The questions to be answered were: what do we really want? 
how must we act in order to obtain it?”) (citation omitted). 
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engages with two distinct claims.94 First, it accepts that judges possess 
some form of latent wisdom and that they will “generally do best by 
deferring to the wisdom embodied in precedent and tradition, rather than 
trusting” reason.95 Second, it claims that “legal principles such as fairness 
and equality reside within the common law, are constitutive of legality, and 
inform (or should inform) statutory interpretation on judicial review.”96 
There is no doubt, as our tour guide at the Constitutional Court 
understood so well, that constitutionalism possesses many of the 
characteristics of the common law tradition and that the processes 
Monaghan described have emerged as the “pervasive mode of 
constitutional enforcement.”97 
D. The Post-War Civil Law/Common Law Clash in the German Legal Culture 
If the first two premises have been confirmed, then what have been 
the consequences of the emergence of a vital and effective constitutional 
law regime in a German legal culture long dominated by the civil law 
tradition? The third premise of this prevalent narrative is that the civil law 
and the common law traditions have found themselves in conflict with one 
another, vying for the soul of the German jurist. 
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Stephenson, The Prices of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative 
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In fact, that tension is on spectacular display in Karlsruhe, Germany. 
On the northern edge of this charming little city known as the Hauptstadt 
des Rechts (“Capital of Justice”), the “new” Constitutional Court serves as 
the “protector of the Grundgesetz” from its sleek, modern, Bauhaus-
influenced building. But the Constitutional Court has had to carve out a 
place for itself alongside the revered Federal Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof). From its baroque residence in a leafy neighborhood in 
the southwest corner of Karlsruhe, the Federal Court of Justice, a most 
civilian institution, presides as the last-instance jurisdiction over Germany’s 
four great codifications, including the Civil Code. The Federal Court of 
Justice, in particular, is seen as a bastion of civilian formalism and 
positivism in Germany. Its judgments have been described as formulaic, 
abstract, “highly conceptual, even metaphysical,” and containing “detailed 
consideration of the views of contemporary (and past) academic writers.”98 
That is classic civilian jurisprudence. 
Knut Wolfgang Nörr characterizes this clash of cultures as a struggle 
between codification and the constitution.99 There was good reason to 
believe that codification would persist as the Leitbild (essence) of German 
law even after the Basic Law entered into force.100 After all, Nörr explains, 
“the civil code had survived the Nazi regime, at least in its outward 
shape.”101 The question was whether German law “would find its identity” 
by returning to codification’s formalism and positivism, or whether it 
would turn to the new Basic Law and constitutionalism.102  
The horizontal effect principle (Drittwirkung), fashioned early on by the 
Federal Constitutional Court, is significant evidence of the struggle in the 
German legal culture between the constitutional common law and the civil 
law tradition. Horizontal effect refers to the application of the 
constitution’s basic rights protections in the “horizontal” relationships 
between equally positioned individuals. That, however, is the realm of the 
Civil Code. Horizontal effect is the Basic Law’s response to the 
prominence of the German Civil Code, which was thought to 
comprehensively regulate these private relations. Nörr explains how 
horizontal effect sought to resolve the conflict between the civil law and 
constitutional law: 
Of course, the question came up from which source [post-war] 
norms should be taken. One usually turned to the values of the 
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Codification, of the codes themselves to extract from them the 
standards for the development of law. In this respect[,] a crucial 
change occurred [after the promulgation of the Basic Law]. Certain 
constitutional jurists founded the doctrine of the [Civil Code’s] 
general clauses being the link between the Codification and the 
Basic Rights of the Constitution [so-called “Drittwirkung der 
Grundrechte”]. The doctrine maintains that also the relationship 
between individuals ought to be measured to a certain extent by 
the standards of the Basic Rights. Whereas according to the 
traditional view the Basic Rights serve to protect the citizen against 
the power of the state, now they shall protect one citizen against 
the other. The Constitutional Court in 1958 adopted this theory 
[in the Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198]. In this way, the Constitution 
— through the general clauses of the Codification — found its 
way into the Codification itself, and right into its zones of 
growth.103 
E. The Myth of German Constitutional Law’s Triumph over Civilian Formalism 
and Positivism 
According to the myth, the result of this culture clash has been 
constitutional law’s victory over the civil law tradition. But constitutional 
law’s triumph in Germany is just another way of saying that the common 
law tradition now plays a prominent role in the German legal culture 
where it is in dialogue with the still-predominant formalism and positivism 
of the civil law tradition. 
In many ways, this victory is Gustav Radbruch’s story. The twentieth-
century German legal philosopher’s life and work have come to embody 
the prevailing myth.104 The University of Heidelberg law professor is 
widely seen as having championed legal positivism alongside Kelsen and 
others before the Nazis dismissed him from the university because of his 
social-democratic politics.105 According to the accepted version of 
events,106 the horror of witnessing the immoral uses to which the Nazis 
could put Germany’s strictly formalist and positivist jurisprudence turned 
Radbruch against the civilian tradition, a conversion he supposedly 
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consecrated in his famous post-war essay, “Statutory Lawlessness and 
Supra-Statutory Law” (Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht).107 In the 
essay Radbruch seethes with disdain for the Nazis’ reliance on legal 
positivism as a defense in their post-war criminal trials.108 The Nazis’ claim 
that “‘a law is a law,’” Radbruch agonizes, “expressed the positivistic legal 
thinking that, almost unchallenged, held sway over German jurists for 
many decades.”109 The essay is still celebrated for Radbruch’s resounding 
rejection of the positivist tradition, but it was a struggle that he said was 
“being taken up everywhere.”110 Radbruch proposed a formula that would 
free judges from the fetters of banal statutory interpretation and blind 
application of the codes so that they might pursue supra-statutory justice. 
If that sounds nothing like the civil law tradition, with its technocratic 
judges unquestioningly applying the legislature’s statutes,111 then it just 
might be Radbruch’s call for the ascendance of the common law.112 
It is, at the same time, the triumph of constitutional law. In fact, the 
Constitutional Court rather self-consciously imagines itself to be 
Radbruch’s heir. The Court’s justices are the rarefied German jurists who 
are at last truly free of the formalist and positivist bonds of unjust statutes. 
We know this because, from its earliest decisions, the Constitutional Court 
acknowledged its authority to refuse to enforce unjust laws. This 
exceptional circumstance, the Court explained, would exist if the “norm in 
question so evidently contradicts the principle of justice that prevails in all 
formal law, such that the judge who would be applying or accepting the 
legal consequences of the norm would in fact be enforcing injustice rather 
than justice.”113 This is just Radbruch’s formula, which provides that “the 
positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even 
when its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the 
conflict between statute and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that 
the statute, as ‘flawed law,’ must yield to justice.”114 And in case there was 
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any doubt, the Constitutional Court explicitly invoked Radbruch’s formula 
when it denied East German leaders and border guards the benefit of a 
formalistic and positivistic application of the Basic Law’s prohibition on 
the ex post facto application of criminal law.115 After reunification, the 
complainants were convicted of murder for the shooting deaths of East 
Germans attempting to flee across the border to West Germany during the 
Cold War. Of course, the mortal defense of East Germany’s “anti-fascist 
barrier” was legal under — and in fact was mandated by — East German 
law.116 The defendants could be convicted by courts in a newly unified 
Germany that were applying old West German criminal law only if they 
were to reject the formalist civilian tenet providing that “a law is a law.” 
That is what the ordinary courts did.117 And that is how the Constitutional 
Court upheld the convictions in the Wall Shooting Case.118 The 
Constitutional Court explained that the lesson of the Radbruch formula 
was that the “fundamental principle of legal certainty,” which is the 
promise of civilian formalism and positivism, “can be given less weight 
than material justice if the law would otherwise lead to an intolerable 
violation of justice.”119 The Constitutional Court’s Wall Shooting Case 
decision was regarded as a profound victory for justice over civilian legal 
formalism and positivism. At the same time, it was a victory for the 
justices and the common law tradition that gives them priority. 
The myth has no less force with respect to more commonplace 
jurisprudence that does not involve the constitutional reckoning with 
Germany’s totalitarian pasts. The mere exercise of unexceptional judicial 
review is a species of the same common law judicial power, and it is a 
significant departure from the formalist and positivist tradition in the 
German legal culture that has long given priority to the Gesetzgeber (the 
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“legislator”).120 The German Constitutional Court has assumed this new 
role with great enthusiasm and confidence. It is no exaggeration when 
scholars characterize the German Federal Constitutional Court as the 
“most powerful constitutional court in the world.”121 Elsewhere, I have 
remarked that the “Court’s decision-making record might suggest a 
tribunal embarked on a path of relentless activism.”122 Others have simply 
taken to calling reunified, post-war Germany the “Karlsruhe Republic.”123 
A former Federal Justice Minister concludes that “in Germany, all power 
issues have become constitutional issues,” to be resolved by the Court.124 
And true to the myth, the Court is not seen as meddlesome or 
overreaching. To the contrary, the Court consistently is the most respected 
social institution in the country.125 In fact, the Court is widely credited with 
having established democracy, the rule of law, rights protections, and 
general prosperity for what seemed to be an ungovernable and 
treacherously unruly German nation. As one comparative law scholar puts 
it: “[T]he stability and prosperity . . . Germany enjoyed over the last half of 
the 20th Century bespeaks the integrity and efficacy of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.”126  
Some now believe that constitutional law (with its common law 
character) has supplanted the civil law tradition as Germany’s dominant 
jurisprudential frame. Donald Kommers concludes that much of the Basic 
Law’s regime derives from “the gloss the Federal Constitutional Court has 
put on the text of the Basic Law,” implying a nature and style of judicial 
decision-making that is much more closely attuned to the common law’s 
vision of judging and that is far removed from the judicial restraint typical 
of the civil law tradition.127 In a commemoration written on the two-
hundredth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s seminal 
decision Marbury v. Madison,128 former Federal Constitutional Court Justice 
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Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem underscores the importance of constitutional 
law’s counter-civilian influence in post-war German legal culture. With the 
supremacy of the post-war Basic Law, as interpreted and enforced by the 
Federal Constitutional Court’s justices, Hoffmann-Riem concludes that 
this paradigm shift had finally and decisively overtaken Germany. 
Hoffmann-Riem confirms the prominent role played by the Federal 
Constitutional Court when he states that “the jurisdiction of this court is 
particularly wide-ranging” and considerably greater than the review 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.129 The Federal Constitutional 
Court, Hoffmann-Riem says, “has been proactive” and has “continually 
expanded its identity.”130 This has placed it, unbending, in conflict with the 
high federal courts. 
Nörr concludes that, with the dawning of Germany’s post-war 
(common law) constitutional order, “the Basic Law became the point of 
reference for the [West German] legal system and in this function 
superseded the Codification: for good, it seems.”131 In his estimation, and 
in the estimation of our tour guide at the Constitutional Court, this has 
been a definitive and irreversible paradigm shift. 
III. GERMANY’S CIVILIAN CONSTITUTION 
The encounter between the civil law tradition and the common law 
tradition in the German legal system has not been a one-way street. It is 
not just Germany’s old civilian approach to the law that has been touched 
by the common law tradition; the civil law tradition has also had an 
influence on German constitutional law. The gravitational pull of the civil 
law tradition in Germany is simply too strong for it to have been 
otherwise. 
The evidence of the persistent civilian orientation of German law — 
even German constitutional law — can be seen, inter alia, in the code-like 
text of the Basic Law, in some theories about constitutional law in 
Germany, in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, and in the 
Constitutional Court’s judicial style. 
A. The Basic Law as Code 
In many places the text of the Basic Law has the characteristics of a 
civilian code. Some provisions are famously short and open-textured, such 
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as the terse promise in Article 1 that “human dignity shall be inviolable.”132 
These provisions naturally demand a rambling, unfettered interpretive role 
from the Constitutional Court. And in those places, German constitutional 
law lurches decisively in the direction of the common law tradition with its 
confidence in the judiciary. But many other provisions in the Basic Law 
are long, detailed, and systematic, exceeding even the depth and scope of 
many paragraphs of the Civil Code. These provisions, in their precision, 
seem designed to prescribe a very specific constitutional result rather than 
map the stars of constitutional values. These code-like constitutional 
provisions necessarily limit the Constitutional Court’s interpretive room to 
maneuver. The so-called “Financial Constitution,” among the Basic Law’s 
other structural provisions, is especially exemplary of the Basic Law’s 
civilian orientation. Article 106, as just one example, covers the 
“apportionment of tax revenue” in ten subparagraphs and more than 1000 
words.133 This is not a framework of broad principles to be interpreted by 
the Constitutional Court in the style of the common law. It is a detailed 
and definitive arrangement for revenue distribution, involving all sources 
and attributable across all levels of German government. The federation, 
the Basic Law tells us, is entitled to revenues generated by “the road 
freight tax;”134 the states are entitled to the revenues generated by the 
“motor-vehicle tax.”135 The Basic Law’s specific accounting of all tax 
revenues proceeds in the same amount of detail in the rest of Article 106 
and across a number of other provisions. This feels more like legislation 
than constitutional law. 
Several basic rights provisions also contain nearly definitive detail. 
Article 7, for example, addresses the “school system” in six subparagraphs 
and more than 250 words.136 Article 12a, speaking to “compulsory military 
service,” involves six subparagraphs and 500 words.137 Article 13, which 
provides constitutional protection for the “inviolability of the home,” 
consists of seven subparagraphs and more than 400 words.138 It is a 
detailed text that very clearly aspires to a systematic and comprehensive 
solution to the issues involved. Article 13 is patently deductive in its 
content and structure. It begins with the broad principle that the home is 
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sacrosanct.139 It then descends through a series of ever-more-precise 
exceptions and their accompanying procedural requirements.140 
American constitutional law may offer similar protection for the 
sanctity of the home,141 but it does not build from a similarly concrete 
textual commitment.142 The extensive regime of exceptions to that 
protection have been mapped through generations of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions, which mold the constitution’s meaning at its joints and in its 
ambiguities.143 It would not have dawned on the drafters of the American 
Fourth Amendment, steeped as they were in the common law’s judicial 
suppleness, that they might have aspired to anything like the rigid and 
comprehensive constitutional codification found in Article 13 of the Basic 
Law.144  
B. Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Codification 
Theorists in Germany have embraced this codified understanding of 
the constitution. Peter Unruh has explained that some constitutional 
theory in Germany, under the influence of the civil law tradition, has 
sought to treat the Basic Law as part of the civil law tradition.145 This 
theoretical approach accepts that constitutions are not a classical example 
of codification. But it insists that there is no reason why constitutions must 
be treated as antithetical to civilian codification. In particular, Unruh notes, 
the Basic Law creates a closed constitutional system that is similar to the 
comprehensive and complete order framed by the Civil Code.146 On the 
one hand, the Basic Law requires that all constitutional change occurs 
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prohibits some constitutional changes.147 The result of this arrangement is 
the suggestion that there is no constitutional law beyond the written text 
of the Basic Law. This is not a place for judicially-conceived penumbras. 
A constitution can claim to be a comprehensive and systematic regime 
addressing the state’s organization as well as the relation between the 
citizen and the state.148 A constitution can be civilian. In fact, the Basic 
Law’s extensive coverage of the state’s financial competences in Articles 
104a-115 (its more than 2000 words seeking to completely enclose the 
subject) suggests that the German constitution comprehensively defines 
and demarcates all state power, in the same way that a code aspires to 
definitively occupy the field it governs. This is a possible reading of the 
whole Basic Law, which objectively defines the individual and citizen,149 
frames the boundaries for and roles of the states and the federation,150 
provides for the legislative power,151 establishes the executive power,152 
and institutes the judicial power.153 Very little relating to state power, and 
its relationship with individuals, is left unwritten. 
Similar to other codes, the Basic Law seeks to establish a reasonable, 
consistent, and permanent legal order. Historically, constitutionalism 
originates from the same era of Enlightenment rationality as the classical 
codification in France, when Napoleon sought to give the legal system — 
and society with it — a rational basis in the code.154 
The Basic Law is a code in all of these respects and, consequently, is 
often treated as a codification in German jurisprudence. This also involves 
the approach scholars take toward constitutional law. Similar to the way 
the other codes are studied, German constitutional law scholars write 
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commentaries on the Basic Law.155 These commentaries pursue a 
systematic exegesis of each article in the constitution. This tradition, a 
distinct part of the civil law culture, has no equivalent in the United States’ 
common law-oriented constitutional scholarship and practice.156 Of 
course, casebooks are almost unknown in Germany.157 
Werner Heun explains that, in technical terms, constitutional law in 
Germany has been treated as if it were codified civil law.158 Constitutional 
law, Heun notes, is assessed in almost complete accordance with the 
conditions of the dogmatic science that dominates the practice and study 
of the codes. This can be seen in several ways. First, “the Constitution is 
regarded as a predetermined normative decision, which is beyond criticism 
within the system.”159 Second, constitutional analysis aims for the 
“systematization of all written and unwritten rules, their interpretation and 
development.”160 Third, “the interpretation of the Basic Law essentially 
follows the commonly accepted classical rules and methods that were 
established already by Friedrich Carl von Savigny in the early nineteenth 
century.”161 This interpretive canon, similar to civilian statutory 
interpretation, gives priority to text, system, structure, and teleology. Heun 
explains that original intent, with its practice of divining meaning from the 
ether of history and far afield from the constitutional code, “plays only a 
minor role.”162 Finally, Heun notes that the “Constitutional Court, 
affirmed by the overwhelming majority of scholars, has always stressed the 
‘objective meaning’ of a provision.”163 This, of course, is the abstract and 
conceptual approach taken to interpreting comprehensive codes.164 
C. The Basic Law’s Deference to Statutory Law 
The Basic Law’s civilian orientation is also evident in its preference for 
legislative resolution of its interpretive ambiguities. Especially with respect 
to the protection of basic rights, where the constitutional text might never 
have achieved code-like detail and precision, the Basic Law often assigns 
the task of rounding out the meaning of the enumerated rights to the 
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legislature. The common law solution to these uncertainties is to entrust 
the matter to the courts. The approach adopted by the Basic Law, 
however, denies the Constitutional Court the fullest possible authority 
over the Basic Law’s meaning. The civil law’s confidence in legislation — 
and its distrust for the judiciary — is unmistakable in this arrangement.165 
The Constitutional Court is not troubled by its subordination: “The 
Court has . . . stated on numerous occasions that it will not substitute its 
judgment of sound or wise public policy for that of the legislature.”166 
Thus, the Court exercises significant restraint when reviewing legislation 
that is enacted pursuant to the legislature’s authority to define and limit 
constitutional law, despite the fact that the legislation directly touches 
upon the enjoyment of a basic right. One example of this framework can 
be found in Article 5, which provides for “[f]reedom of expression, arts, 
and sciences.”167 The freedom of expression, information, and press that is 
unequivocally asserted by the article’s first subparagraph is framed by the 
second subparagraph, which gives the legislature the central role in 
defining the scope of the right: “These rights shall find their limits in the 
provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young 
persons, and in the right to personal honour.”168 The Court’s role when 
reviewing these constitutionally ordained legislative limits on the freedom 
of expression is largely to assess them for their proportionality.169 That, 
however, is not the same thing as judging the substance of the parliament’s 
decisions about the scope of and limits on the freedom of expression. In 
terms that simply radiate with the residual ethos of the civil law tradition, 
Hans Jarass explains that, “for the exercise of basic rights, fundamental 
questions must be settled by the parliament.”170 
D. The Nature of the Constitutional Court’s Jurisdiction 
The civilian orientation of German constitutional law is also apparent 
in the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. First, that the Court does not 
have discretion to select the cases it will review suggests that its decisions 
— although profoundly influential — do not formally establish 
precedent.171 Precedential authority, however, is a central feature of the 
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common law’s embrace of judicial law-making.172 Second, the Court’s 
abstract review jurisdiction anticipates constitutional judgments that will be 
taken wholly on the basis of the abstract legal principles involved and 
without reference to the specific facts of a discrete and actual 
controversy.173 This is the civil law’s deductive approach to law and not 
the common law’s inductive, case-specific orientation.  
E. The Constitutional Court’s Civilian Decisional Style 
The Constitutional Court’s decisional style also suggests the strong 
influence the civil law tradition maintains over German constitutional law. 
Maybe this should not be surprising. After all, the Federal Constitutional 
Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) provides that eight of the Court’s 
justices must have served as judges at the federal high courts, such as the 
Federal Court of Justice.174 These federal high courts sit as the last instance 
of review in disputes arising out of distinct code regimes, including the 
Civil Code. Judges reach these prestigious ranks of the judiciary by having 
demonstrated mastery over the civilian application and interpretation of 
codified law. 
The Constitutional Court’s decisions unwaveringly hew to a formulaic 
structure that seems to yearn for the systematic and orderly nature of the 
civil law, even in the midst of the chaos and liberty that judges confront in 
the constitutional common law. Every one of the Constitutional Court’s 
judgments follows the same pattern: In Section A., the Court provides an 
objective presentation of the relevant law, facts, and procedural 
background, as well as the arguments of complainants. In Section B., the 
Court provides an objective presentation of the respondents’ arguments 
and the presentations made at a hearing (if one was held), including the 
contributions to the proceeding from experts in the relevant facts and law. 
In Section C., the Court announces and justifies its decisions regarding 
admissibility and the merits of the case. Anyone familiar with the rambling, 
unsystematic, facts-heavy judicial style of the United States Supreme 
Court’s judgments is immediately struck by the systematic, abstract, and 
rational structure of the Constitutional Court’s decisions.  
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The following practices also confirm the Constitutional Court’s civilian 
understanding of constitutional law because they reinforce the law’s 
abstract or conceptual nature. First, the Court almost always reaches its 
decisions by unanimous judgments.175 This helps to avoid the impression 
that constitutional decision-making is a matter of the justices’ personal or 
political preferences. Constitutional law is presented as a coherent and 
objective normative framework. It does not appear, as is often the case in 
the judgments of the United States Supreme Court, as a pluralistic and 
disputed enterprise that lurches toward results only through sometimes-
fragile majorities of the justices. The Constitutional Court justices have 
had a right to publish dissenting opinions since the early 1970s, but, in 
keeping with the civil law’s principled conceptualism, they rarely do so.176 
Second, the Court has developed highly systematized approaches to its 
practice in the areas of constitutional interpretation that otherwise would 
have demanded the greatest discretion and flexibility. In this way, the 
Court has sought to limit and restrain its role in ways that resonate with 
the civil law tradition’s suspicion of judicial power. 
The Court invariably approaches the review of alleged basic rights 
violations by resorting to a formula prominently promoted by the scholars 
Bodo Pieroth and Bernhard Schlink (now joined by Thorsten Kingreen 
and Ralf Poscher).177 Adjudicating the constitution’s basic rights might 
have involved a nearly unbounded jurisprudential practice, especially when 
one considers that the broad textual framing rights, such as dignity, 
personality, and equality, must be given. But the Court has yoked itself to a 
three-part formula that gives its work in this context the feeling of 
objectivity and scientific inquiry. In the first step, the Court begins by 
defining the scope of the asserted constitutional protection. This, for 
example, requires the Court to answer the question “to whom or what 
does the basic right apply?” In the second step, the Court assesses whether 
there has been a direct or indirect encroachment upon the protectable 
scope of the basic right. In the third step, the Court determines whether an 
encroachment on the basic right has been justified. This, in turn, requires 
the Court to follow one of two systematic paths: one for rights that can be 
limited by statute178 and another for rights that are absolute.179 Each of 
these tracks involves a distinct, systematized assessment.  
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The central component of step three (the determination whether an 
encroachment is justified) is the application of the proportionality principle 
for which the Court is well-known.180 The proportionality principle might 
be characterized as an open-ended balancing test that gives the justices 
unchecked and dangerously subjective discretion to assign “weight” to 
competing interests and to reach conclusions on the basis of an 
unsystematic balancing exercise.181 There is some truth in this critique, but 
the criticism should grapple with the Constitutional Court’s highly 
methodical approach to proportionality analysis. In fact, in the system 
developed by the Court, the proportionality principle involves balancing or 
weighing only as the last of four steps in the analysis.182 Before 
determining whether measures that encroach upon basic rights are 
proportional to the benefits they are intended to produce, the Court must 
first examine whether the measures are legitimate, suitable, and necessary. 
The Court faithfully resolves each of these threshold standards before 
taking up the less-bounded challenge of balancing or weighing interests.183 
IV. CONCLUSION 
My American law students were relieved to hear the tour guide’s claim 
that the German Constitutional Court was the country’s common law 
tribunal. Implied in the claim was the idea that the entire German legal 
culture was now keyed to the common law. After all, whatever else the 
American students might have understood about their visit to the Court in 
Karlsruhe, they knew that the Constitutional Court is Germany’s most 
powerful and important judicial organ. The common law — the tour guide 
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wanted them to believe — now radiates across all German law. This put 
the young American jurists on stable and familiar ground. It was a 
different country and a different legal tradition, the sentiment ran, but at 
least when it comes to constitutional law we speak the same (common law) 
language. It must have been the familiarity that the tour guide sought to 
engender with her remark that emboldened that group of too-often-
reluctant students to join the discussion about the Court with real interest 
and vigor. The questions they raised quickly exposed the problems with 
the tour guide’s claim about the Constitutional Court’s common law 
orientation. “Who is the best known justice?” one of the students asked. 
The tour guide explained that the Court’s President often has a significant 
public profile. But she noted that the Constitutional Court’s justices, 
mostly working anonymously and unanimously, do not enjoy anything like 
the celebrity of the United States Supreme Court justices. “What was her 
favorite dissenting opinion?” another student asked. The justices of the 
Constitutional Court are rarely divided in their votes, the tour guide 
explained. And when they are, it is even rarer for the dissenters to write a 
separate opinion. “What is the Court’s process for deciding which cases it 
will consider?” a third student asked. The tour guide explained that the 
Constitutional Court doesn’t select the cases on its docket, but must 
decide all admissible cases. Another student asked, “What are the 
standards the Court follows if it wants to abandon its own precedent?” 
The tour guide explained that the Constitutional Court does not follow the 
common law doctrine of stare decisis. The magic of the earlier moment, 
stirred when the tour guide declared the Court to be Germany’s only 
common law tribunal, was waning. Maybe it was the bank of clouds that 
had crept in front of the sun and muted the glow of the Constitutional 
Court’s hearing chamber. But one of my students put it more bluntly. 
“Well,” she said, “this doesn’t sound like any common law court I’m 
familiar with.” 
Constitutional law has not only been the vehicle for the common law’s 
triumph over civilian formalism and positivism in the post-War German 
legal culture as the prevailing myth would suggest. German constitutional 
law has also been colored by the still-predominant civil law tradition. In 
fact, German constitutional law is distinctly and significantly civilian in 
character and style. This is nothing more than the symbiotic interchange 
between legal traditions that H. Patrick Glenn envisioned. The 
continuously evolving mix of these traditions — as well as of history, 
politics, and culture — leaves us undeniably with Germany’s uniquely 
German constitutional law. It suggests that any credible study of German 
constitutional law must account for the German constitutional regime’s 
128 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 57:1 
civilian orientation and a potentially infinite array of other “traces.”184 
More broadly, my thesis serves as a warning for comparative lawyers who 
might be tempted to neglect a particular constitutional culture’s unique 
socio-legal frame in pursuit of comparisons that rely on generalized or 
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